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ABSTRACT
Internet service discovery is an emerging topic to study
the deployment of protocols. Towards this end, our
community periodically scans the entire advertised IPv4
address space. In this paper, we question this princi-
ple. Being good Internet citizens means that we should
limit scan traffic to what is necessary. We conducted a
study of scan data, which shows that several prefixes do
not accommodate any host of interest and the network
topology is fairly stable. We argue that this allows us
to collect representative data by scanning less. In our
paper, we explore the idea to scan all prefixes once and
then identify prefixes of interest for future scanning.
Based on our analysis of the censys.io data set (4.1 TB
data encompassing 28 full IPv4 scans within 6 months)
we found that we can reduce scan traffic between 25-90%
and miss only 1-10% of the hosts, depending on desired
trade-offs and protocols.
1. INTRODUCTION
Fast Internet-wide scanning is growing in popularity
among researchers. At the time of writing, researchers
regularly scan the Internet for vulnerable SSL certifi-
cates [6,12], SSH public keys [10], and for the banners
of plain text protocols such as SMTP, HTTP, FTP,
and Telnet [5]. The majority of researchers scan at
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least 2.8 billion addresses advertised in the IPv4 address
space [5–8, 10–12, 15, 16, 19]. Hitrates, the fraction of
probed addresses from which a response is received, are
very often under two percent [7]. This means that most
scan traffic is overhead. Most of these scans are done
periodically for trend analyses, which exacerbates the
amount of unnecessary scan traffic. For example, the
ongoing Internet-wide research project censys.io [5, 7]
probes the IANA allocated address space for 19 proto-
cols on a continuous basis. This results in 72.2 billion
generated IP-packets per week. which causes several
hostile responses ranging from threatening legal actions
to conducted denial-of-service attacks [7]. Whereas scan-
ning the IPv4 address space is feasible this is not any
more the case for IPv6. When IPv6 becomes more popu-
lar, we need scanning strategies that limit scans to parts
of the address space that are in use.
Many measurement scenarios require only partial
scans instead of exploring the full IP address space.
However, we currently lack a systematic understanding
of the deployment of Internet services with respect to
IP address ranges.
In this paper, we want to start the discussion how we
can reduce scan traffic systematically. We present the
Topology Aware Scanning Strategy (TASS), a new IP
prefix based and topology aware scanning strategy for
periodic scanning. TASS enables researchers to collect
responses from 90-99% of the available hosts for six
months by scanning only 10-75% of the announced IPv4
address space in each scan cycle (protocol dependent).
TASS is seeded with the results of a full advertised IPv4
address scan for a given protocol and time period. The
prefixes for all responses will be selected for periodic
scans of the given protocol.
Periodic scanning of only selected prefixes reduces
scan traffic significantly while hitting most of the hosts
of interest. For instance, our analysis reveals that re-
sponsive prefixes obtained from a full FTP scan cover
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Figure 1: Current scanning strategies and their
scoping of the IPv4 address space.
98% of all FTP hosts 6 months later, at the cost of
scanning only 57.4% of the advertised addresses. The
scanning overhead can be optimized further by omitting
prefixes with a low density. Here, density denotes the
fraction of hosts per address space size. For example,
if we limit prefix selection to a 95% coverage of the
responsive addresses then we can still find 92.3% of the
FTP hosts after six months while scanning only 20.6%
of the announced address space. Moving forward we
plan to investigate whether the distributions of found
and missed hosts are the same.
For our evaluation of TASS we use 4.1 TB of data de-
rived from 28 full IPv4 scans obtained from censys.io [5].
For common protocols we show that, following an ini-
tial scan of the full IPv4 address space, the hitrate for
responsive prefixes decreases by about 0.3 percent per
month compared to what a full scan would find.
Consequently, periodical TASS scans are 1.25 to 10
times more efficient for a period of at least 6 months if
researchers accept a single-digit percentage reduction in
host coverage.
2. STATE OF THE ART
TASS represents a trade-off between scanning over-
head and results accuracy. In what follows, we review
the kinds of trade-offs other researchers have made pre-
viously. We identified three kinds of approaches in the
literature: (i) full scans of IANA allocated addresses,
(ii) scans of routable addresses and (iii) scans of address
space samples.
IANA allocated address space. The most basic
approach is to scan all IP addresses covered by the /0
prefix. Scans of this type seek to explore the reachability
of all potential hosts. However, some (unicast) addresses
do not offer public services per definition, for example,
private networks addresses and the loopback addresses.
Excluding these unallocated or reserved addresses is the
first obvious step towards a reduction of scanning noise.
This has been a common practice from the beginning
[6,8, 11,12] and is still being practiced [5, 7].
Announced IP addresses (BGP). The second type
of trade-off involves only addresses that are covered in
global BGP tables [10,15,16,19].
IP hitlists and samples. Several researchers sampled
parts of the IPv4 address space in order to extrapolate
from their data. For example, Alt et al. [1] scanned
for honeypots by probing at least one host in all /24
blocks of the Internet. Rossow [18] used a random
sample of 1 million IP addresses in his research on traffic
amplification threats. Heidemann et al. [11] probed
1% of the address space repeatedly, which consisted of
24,000 /24 blocks. These blocks were compiled based on
three different selection strategies: (i) 50% were selected
randomly, (ii) 25% were selected if a host in this block
was responsive before, and (iii) 25% were selected by
other policies. This approach does not discriminate
between prefixes of different sizes and therefore it does
not utilize potentially important topology information.
Sampling leads to a reduction of scan traffic, but is
less suited for research that requires precise statistics.
Whereas samples tend to be probabilistic, hitlists are
compiled based on predetermined characteristics. Fan
and Heidemann [9] generated IP address hitlists by scan-
ning the IPv4 address space repeatedly and by filtering
out addresses that were consistently responsive. Their
approach was applicable to only a third of the Internet,
though, and exhibited 40-50% fluctuation after three
months, probably caused by dynamic IP addresses. By
comparison, TASS compiles prefix hitlists and exhibits
only 1-10% fluctuation after six months. Dynamic IP
addresses fluctuate within a particular prefix, which may
explain why TASS is significantly more stable.
Cai and Heidemann [2] investigated the responsive-
ness of /24 blocks (note the difference from /24 network
prefixes). They probed 1% of the Internet address space
by selecting /24 blocks that were responsive to ICMP
probes, as shown by a prior census of all allocated ad-
dresses. They clustered blocks with adjacent addresses
and similar network behavior, and found that a fifth of
the /24 blocks had a utilization less than 10%.
Plonka et al. [17] used passive IPv6 measurements of
WWW clients for identification of stable and dense IPv6
prefixes. We use active scan data and focus on hosts,
but we are aware that a combination of both approaches
might lead to a more comprehensive solution.
Summary. The objectives of most of the measurement
studies do not require a priori scanning of unreachable
address space. The state of the art in Internet scanning
appears to base trade-offs primarily on IP blocks and
individual IP addresses. We are not aware of attempts
other than ours to leverage network prefix responsiveness
for scan traffic reduction.
3. TOPOLOGY-AWARE SCANNING
In this section, we give a high-level overview over
TASS, followed by an empirical motivation why TASS
is a promising trade-off between scanning overhead and
accuracy. An evaluation of TASS performance over time
is given in Section 4. We used the FTP, HTTP, HTTPS,
and CPE WAN Management Protocol (CWMP). For
brevity, we provide graphs primarily for FTP and HTTPS.
3.1 TASS in a Nutshell
TASS amortizes the overhead of an initial scan of
the full routable address space over repeated scans that
cover only a subset of all prefixes. The core idea of TASS
is to identify prefixes which are of primary interest when
scanning the Internet repeatedly. The goal of TASS is
to be efficient. Efficiency is measured as the number of
successful protocol handshakes per number of connection
attempts. TASS is parameterized by an adjustable
target ratio φ that specifies the proportion of hosts that
TASS shall cover in repeated scans. For this reason, we
refer to φ as the host coverage. TASS works as follows:
1. At time t0, perform a full scan and output all re-
sponsive addresses. Let N be their number. Count
the number of responsive addresses ci in each re-
sponsive prefix i. The sum of all ci is N .
2. Calculate the density ρi = ci/2
32−prefix length of all
responsive prefixes and their relative host coverage
φi = ci/N of responsive addresses.
3. Sort the prefixes in the descending order of density.
Relabel prefixes so that i < j ⇔ ρi > ρj .
4. Find the smallest k so that
∑k
i=1 φi > φ.
5. Scan prefixes 1, . . . , k repeatedly until time t0 + ∆t,
then start over at step 1.
Within each time interval [t0, t0 + ∆t] there will be a
gradual loss of results accuracy as hosts leave or enter
prefixes other than prefixes 1, . . . , k. On each full scan,
full accuracy is recovered. We motivate in the remainder
of this section why we expect this strategy to yield
high accuracy with significantly reduced scan overhead.
We evaluate the strategy in Section 4 and quantify the
expected loss of accuracy over time, which yields an
adjustable time period ∆t.
3.2 Prefix derivation
TASS requires that addresses are mapped to prefixes.
The censys.io dataset already contains prefix information
that Durumeric et al. [5] apparently obtained from their
outgoing AS. However, closer inspection reveals that
the included information is often coarse-grained or even
missing. For this reason, we chose to use the Routeviews
Prefix-to-AS mappings (pfx2as) provided by CAIDA [3]
instead. Said mappings reflect a topological view of the
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(a) Announced prefixes.
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Figure 2: The less specific l-prefix /8 contains
the more specific m-prefix /12. The l-prefix is
then decomposed into the more specific one and
the remaining smallest prefixes.
Internet, are fine-grained, and are used routinely for
research.
It is worth noting that prefixes in BGP may be loosely
aggregated. In particular, more specific prefixes (m-
prefixes, e.g. 100.0.0.0/12) may be announced in parallel
to less specific prefixes (l-prefixes, e.g. 100.0.0.0/8). The
CAIDA data includes a large fraction of more specific
prefixes in addition to less specific prefixes. For example,
the dataset of 2015/09/07 contains 595,644 prefixes of
which 54% are m-prefixes. The m-prefixes account for
34.4% of the advertised IP space.
To reflect potential network characteristics, we deag-
gregate the l-prefix of each m-prefix into the minimal
set of prefixes that contains the m-prefix. This approach
allows us to take all routing information into account
while maintaining a proper partition of the address space
for scanning purposes. See Figure 2 for an illustration
of this process. In the following two sections we show
that this approach potentially reduces the number of
scanned addresses.
3.3 Host stability versus prefix length
We expect that TASS performs well if hosts do not
fluctuate significantly in between prefixes. In a first step,
we analyzed the distribution of host numbers across
prefixes of different lengths over a period of six months
with 7 measurements. If the distribution variance was
high then this would already indicate that TASS may
miss hosts. Figures 3(a) and 3(b) show the results for
the case of l-prefixes, and Figures 3(c) and 3(d) show
the results for the case of m-prefixes. The host numbers
appear to be stable and therefore the results do not
contradict our expectation. Of course, this result is
necessary but not sufficient by itself. We still need to
investigate the fluctuation in between prefixes of the
same length. This is future work that we intend to do
with a larger dataset and for a full paper. The graphs
also indicate a right-shift towards longer prefixes without
a pronounced loss of stability. This lends support to
our hypothesis that m-prefixes are a better choice than
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1 0.762 0.828 0.832 0.477
0.99 0.470 0.548 0.542 0.142
0.95 0.273 0.362 0.343 0.099
0.7 0.031 0.064 0.065 0.043
0.5 0.008 0.021 0.024 0.024
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1 0.574 0.648 0.645 0.332
0.99 0.371 0.440 0.427 0.113
0.95 0.206 0.279 0.262 0.085
0.7 0.023 0.048 0.052 0.037
0.5 0.006 0.017 0.020 0.021
Table 1: IPv4 address space coverage of the pro-
tocols using less and more specific prefixes.
l-prefixes because their density is potentially higher. For
example, if all hosts in an l-prefix cluster in an m-prefix
then the l-prefix minus the m-prefix need not be scanned.
3.4 Prefix density
TASS yields a favorable trade-off if small reductions
in coverage lead to large reductions in scan overhead.
Towards an evaluation of the potential trade-off, we ana-
lyzed the density of prefixes in relation to the advertised
address space. Recall that the density of a prefix is
the number of responsive hosts in the prefix divided
by the number of addresses in the prefix. Figures 4(a)
and 4(b) show the results for the case of l-prefixes, and
Figures 4(c) and 4(d) show the results for the case of
m-prefixes. The graphs are sorted in the order of de-
creasing prefix density ρ, the red curve. Prefixes with
zero density are not included. The green curve is the
cumulative relative host coverage φ. The blue curve
is the cumulative relative address space coverage. The
graphs show a sharp decrease of prefix density combined
with a sharp increase in host coverage and a modest
increase of address space coverage over the range of pre-
fixes. This clearly indicates that prefix selection based
on prefix density is well suited to maximize the efficiency
of scans. Based on the data we analyzed we can report
the following statistics for the case of l-prefixes:
• 100% (φ = 1) of all FTP hosts are found in ∼134 K
prefixes representing 76.2% of the routed address
space.
• 95% (φ = 0.95) of all FTP hosts are found in
∼105 K prefixes representing 27.3% of the routed
address space.
• 23.8% of the addresses were unresponsive.
• The first 20 K prefixes with a density of ρ > 0.04
contain 64% (φ = 0.64) of all FTP servers but
represent only 2% of the advertised address space.
For m-prefixes, an address space coverage of 57.4%
suffices to achieve full host coverage (φ = 1), which
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Figure 5: Hitrate using IP hitlists.
is a reduction of 18.8 percentage points compared to
l-prefixes. At the same time, prefix selection based on
density is roughly twice as efficient as a full scan, for the
FTP protocol. If one tolerates a 5% loss of FTP hosts
then scanning 20.6% of the address space suffices to find
95% of the FTP hosts that a full scan would find. For
detailed information, see Table 1.
4. ACCURACY OVER TIME
The findings we summarized in previous sections sug-
gest that TASS can be an efficient scanning strategy.
However, the benefits manifest only if the distribution of
hosts across prefixes remains reasonably stable over time.
As a first step to quantify the accuracy of TASS over
time we simulated TASS and an address-based hitlist
approach using monthly snapshots of full IPv4 scans
from censys.io [5] for the time period from 09/2015 to
03/2016 (7 snapshots). Then we determined the fraction
of hosts that TASS and the hitlist approach would have
uncovered in each scan cycle compared to a periodic
full scan. We used the aforementioned datasets as our
ground truth, again. We focused our analysis on four
protocols, which were FTP, HTTP, HTTPS and TR-069
also known as the CPE WAN Management Protocol
(CWMP), a 4.1 TB dataset in total. CWMP is used for
remote management of residential gateways. We chose
CWMP for contrast because its purpose differs markedly
from the other two protocols.
4.1 Hitlist accuracy over time
The hitlist approach we simulated takes all addresses
that are responsive in an initial full scan and subse-
quently scans only those addresses. This strategy ex-
hibits maximal efficiency and accuracy for stable (un-
changing) host distributions. Figure 5 show the results
of our simulation. They indicate that the accuracy of
the hitlist approach quickly drops to 80% within one
month and continues to decrease over time for FTP,
HTTP and HTTPS. The drop is much more pronounced
for the CWMP protocol. A likely explanation is that
residential gateways are connected to the Internet via
dynamic IP addresses more often. Over the course of
six months, the accuracy drops to 71% for HTTP and
to 43% for CWMP. From these results we conclude that
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Figure 3: Shows the host distribution over prefix lengths based on seven different measurements from
09/2015 to 03/2016. Prefixes longer than /24 are negligible and have been omitted.
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Figure 4: Shows responsive prefixes ranked by their density (dotted), the cumulative relative host
coverage (solid), and the cumulative relative address space coverage (dashed) with density ρ > 0.
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Figure 6: Hitrate of TASS compared to a full scan.
the hitlist approach is not recommendable for periodic
scanning over time periods of several months.
4.2 TASS accuracy over time
We simulated TASS with l-prefixes and m-prefixes as
described prior over the same six months time period.
Figure 6(a) shows the results for a coverage setting of
φ = 1, that is, full host coverage. Recall that this selects
all prefixes with a non-zero density, that is, ρ > 0. We
found that accuracy decreases at a rate of 0.3% per
month for l-prefixes. For m-prefixes, accuracy decreases
at a rate of up to 0.7% per month or about 4.2% over
the course of six months. The greater efficiency of m-
prefixes is thus paid for by an accuracy reduction twice
as much as for l-prefixes. We repeated our analysis for
a host coverage setting of 95%, that is, φ = 0.95. This
reduced the accuracy further to 90-94%, depending on
the protocol. Figure 6(b) summarizes the outcomes.
We started a similar investigation of SSH and selected
SCADA protocols but to our surprise we found that
accuracy and densities increased over time. Further
scrutiny of the ground truth datasets revealed that the
snapshots for these protocols likely included data from
prior scans. We have notified the main contributor of
censys.io [5] who acknowledged the problem.
5. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
Our results indicate that less specific prefixes yield
greater scanning accuracy over time than more specific
prefixes. A likely cause is that l-prefixes reduce the over-
all number of prefixes, which renders it less likely that a
host fluctuates in between prefixes. On the other hand,
l-prefixes have a higher scanning overhead compared
to m-prefixes. For a full host coverage setting (φ = 1),
the overhead differed by about 15-20 percentage points
according to our analysis in Section 3.4. Consequently,
we must consider this trade-off when deciding between
l-prefixes and m-prefixes.
Likewise, the host coverage setting φ has a significant
influence on the scanning overhead. Even a small re-
duction of host coverage, say from φ = 1 to φ = 0.99,
results in a reduction of scan overhead by 20-30%. As
part of our future work we intend to investigate more
closely how the 1% of missed hosts are distributed in
comparison to the other hosts.
Furthermore, in the context of the analysis of security
incidents (e.g., Heartbleed) it is important to analyse
whether vulnerable servers are distributed equally across
both selected prefixes and omitted prefixes, for φ < 1. If
the distribution was fairly equal then regular estimates
of vulnerable populations could be obtained with good
efficiency and accuracy, for example, with φ = 0.5 and a
small address space coverage of 0.6-0.8% per scan cycle.
Finally, we suspect that more fine-grained prefixes
may help to reduce the scanning overhead even further.
Towards this end, it may be worthwhile to apply the
clustering approach of Cai and Heidemann [2] to network
prefixes. At any rate we are eager to investigate other
data sets, additional protocols and distribution patterns
for longer periods of time.
6. CONCLUSION
Fast Internet-wide scanning is an emerging topic for in-
vestigators who wish to conduct network research based
on up-to-date real world data. This will likely lead to
a proliferation of scanning activities. Projects such as
censys.io already help to curtail the resulting scan traf-
fic by making current datasets available to the Internet
community for research purposes. However, there will
always be objectives that call for individual data col-
lection. The activities of corporations and individuals
must be factored in as well because tools for fast Internet
scanning are widely available. It is desirable to research
and develop tools that tax the address space and the
patience of scan targets more sparingly than brute force.
With TASS, we hope to make progress towards the right
direction: a scanning strategy that is more efficient,
without loosing significant accuracy of the results.
Our initial investigations are promising. By selecting
prefixes for periodic scanning according to density and
by adjusting host coverage, it is feasible to address a
wide range of trade-offs. Particularly, small compromises
with regard to host coverage can reduce scan overhead
substantially, for four protocols that we investigated
thus far (FTP, HTTP, HTTPS, and CWMP). TASS
opens up a variety of options for further research. When
IPv6 becomes popular, brute forcing the address space
becomes infeasible. By then we ought to have better
approaches for network scanning. Perhaps TASS can
offer a blueprint for tackling that challenge as well.
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